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Will-o' -the-Wisp? The Search for Law in 
Non-International Armed Conflicts 
John F. Murphy' 
I n his remarks as a member of the Types of NlACs and Applicable Law Panel at the Naval War College's International Law Conference on Non-International 
Armed Conflict in the 21st Century, held from June 21 to 23, 2011, David Graham de-
scribed the lawofnon-internationaI armed conflict as being located at the "vanish-
ing point of the law of war." 
This is not surprising, because. as Graham further noted, States resist the appli-
cation of international law to their struggles with rebels. In particular, they resist 
according status to rebels by applying the law of armed conflict (LOAC) to them. 
Rather, they prefer to deal with rebels under their own national criminal laws. free 
from any constraints that might be imposed by the law of armed conlliet. For ex-
ample. Charles Garraway, speaking on the same panel as Graham, pointed out that 
the United Kingdom never acknowledged "the Troubles" in Northern Ireland as 
an "armed conflict" to which the law of armed conflict might apply. 
From a historical perspective, express treaty law governing non-international 
armed conflict was formerly virtually non-existent. After the carnage of World 
War II, and the extreme brutality of the Nazi Germany fo rces, however, there was a 
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marked change of attitude. As reported by Gary D. Solis in his 2010 magisterial 
treatise: 
The framers of the 1949 Conventions determined that there must be some minimal in-
ternational humanitarian protections for the victims of internal armed conflicts---<on-
flictsoccurring within one state's borders, not involving a second nation. World War II 
revealed the stark absence of protections for civilians in wartime. To raise new 
protections would involve a departure from Geneva's previously uninterrupted fixa-
tion on conflicts between states and a certain disregard of the long-entrenched act of 
state doctrine. The international community was unanimous, however, that it could 
not stand by while depredations such as those committed by the Nazis took place in 
future conflicts, internal or not. Not even in the United Nations Charter is there a simi-
lar effort to regulate intrastate armed fo rce. I 
The result was Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.2 ft is the 
only article in the Geneva Conventions that COVers internal armed conflict, and 
"when com mon Article 3 applies, no other part of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
applies. "3 Common Article 3 provides: 
In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory 
of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to ap-
ply, at a minimum, the following provisions: 
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces, 
who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, 
detention, or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely . ... 
As Solis notes, "There follows a brief list of prohibitions, acknowledged to be in-
complete: violence to life and person, in particular murder, mutilation, cruel treat-
ment, and torture; the taking of hostages; humiliating and degrading treatment; 
and the passing of sentences without previous judgments from regularly constituted 
COUrts."4 The positive obligation that Common Article 3 imposes on States parties to 
the Geneva Conventions is, in non-international armed conflicts, to treat those who 
are l/Drs de combat (out of the figh t) humanely. The drafters of Common Article 3 de-
cided, however, not to elaborate on the meaning of "humane treatment."5 
The International Committee of the Red Cross's (JCRC's) study of customary 
international law does provide generalized guidance as to what constitutes humane 
treatment: 
The actual meaning of ~humane treatment" is not spelled out . ... The requirement .. . 
is an overarching concept. It is generally understood that the detailed rules found in 
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international humanitarian law and human rights law give expression to the meaning 
of ~humane treatment." ... However, these rules do not necessarily express the full 
meaning of what is meant by humane treatment, as this notion develops over time un-
der the influence of changes in sodety.6 
By its terms, Common Article 3 applies only to non-international armed con-
flicts. As shall be seen below, however, international and national court decisions 
have declared that its humanitarian norms are so basic that, today, Common Arti-
cle 3 extends to international armed confli cts as well. 
At this early stage in this essay, it is important to note that the international and 
national jurisprudence that has declared Common Article 3 extends to interna-
tional armed conflict illustrates a major difficulty with Common Article 3: bcrause 
of its sparse wording and inherent ambiguities, Common Article 3 raises more 
questions than it answers, and, in particular, these include issues of when it applies 
and whether it can be the basis for criminal prosecutions in international or na-
tional tribunals. 
Before we turn to some of these issues, we need to note the second primary 
source of treaty law on non-international armed conflicts, Additional Protocol 11 
to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.7 Like Additional Protocol 1,8 which concerns in-
ternational armed conflicts, Additional Protocol II is a supplement to the 1949 
Geneva Conventions and does not amend or replace any part ofthem.9 Although 
Additional Protocol II has 166 States parties,IO a number of major States, including 
the United States and Israel, for example, are not parties, and it is unclear what pro-
visions, if any, of the Protocol represent customary internationallaw. 11 Moreover, 
Additional Protocol II is a good example of the unwillingness of States to be 
governed by international law in their internal conflicts with rebel grou ps. This is 
bcrause the "threshold" of applicability of Protocol II to a non-international 
armed conflict is extremely high. Under Article 1(1), Protocol II only applies to 
conflicts between the armed forces of a State party "and dissident armed forces or 
other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such 
control over a part of the territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and con-
certed military operations and to implement this Protocol." Paragraph 2 of 
Article I provides that the Protocol "shall not apply to situations of internal distur-
bances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other 
acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts." 
The result of these explicit limitations is that Additional Protocol II is basically a 
non-operational treaty. As one commentator has noted, the international criminal 
tribunals fo r the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda 
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have produced very little jurisprudence related to Additional Protocol II ... and no ac-
cused has been convicted for a violation of the Protocol. . .. The limited categories of 
anned conflicts to which Additional Protocol II may be said to apply and doubts as to 
the extent to which it is now part of customary international law have deterred the 
Prosecution from entering the realm of Additional Protocol II with much enthusiasm, 
preferring instead to rely on common Article 3 .... Il 
Similarly, George Aldrich, who was the head of the U.S. delegation to the negotia-
tions on the Protocols, has written dismissively: "Protocol II ... affords very lim-
ited protections and has escape clauses designed to make its applicability easily 
deniable. In the end, the only useful result of Protocol II may be to make it some-
what more likely that [Common [ Article 3 ... may be found applicable in lieu of 
ProtocoIII." !) 
1. Filling .he Gaps in and Expanding the Coverage of 
Common Article 3 
Jean-Philippe Lavoyer, a former head of the ICRe's Legal Division, has contended 
that the current law of armed conflict is not the major problem, but rather it is the 
failure to implement it in good faith. 14 This seems clear, but there are at the least 
major differences as to interpretation of the existing rules, even among the leading 
experts of developed Western States, to say nothing of on a worldwide basis. Ideally, 
these ambiguities would be resolved by international negotiations to revise the 
existing law. However, as Dr. Lavoyer has noted, the risk of this route is that it 
might open Pandora's box and result in a much less rather than more satisfactory 
law of armed conflict. IS 
As to gaps in Common Article 3, it is important to note that neither the Geneva 
Conventions, including Common Article 3, nor Additional Protocol I contains a 
definition of an "armed conflict." In contrast, as we have seen, Additional Protocol 
II, in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article I, defines non-international armed conflicts in 
such a way as to sharply limit the scope of the Protocol. But in 1995, in the TadicIn-
terlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 16 the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (iCrY) stepped into the breach and addressed the preliminary 
issue of the existence of an armed conflict in response to a contention by the defen-
dant that there had been no active hostili ties in the area of the alleged crimes at the 
relevant time: 
[W]e find that an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force 
between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities 
and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State. International 
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humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends be-
yond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the 
case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved Until that moment, interna-
tional humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States 
or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, 
whether or not actual combat takes place there. L7 
This definition covers both international and non- international conflicts. There 
is a question whether under it, the U.S. conflict with Al-Qaeda qualifies as an 
armed conflict. As I suggested in another forum, 
[tJhe only time this conflict could have qualified as an international armed conflict 
would have been when the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 and then only to 
the extent that Al-Qaeda forces were integrated into the Taliban forces, the de facto 
army of Afghanistan. At present . .. both the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are fighting as in-
surgents in Afghanistan, and it is arguable that the conflict there now is an internal 
armed conflict. L8 
By now it is well known that in Hamdan v. RumsfeldL9 the Supreme Court re-
jected the assertion by the U.S. government that since Al-Qaeda was not a State and 
had not accepted that it would be governed by the rules set forth in the Geneva 
Conventions, its affiliates could not invoke their protections. Rather, a plurality of 
the Court held that the so-called "war on terror" was a non-international armed 
conflict, and therefore that at a minimwn Common Article 3 applies to the conflict 
with Al-Qaeda. To be sure, this holding has been subject to considerable criticism, 
best illustrated perhaps by Yoram Dinstein's argument that "from the vantage 
point of international law . . . a non-international armed conflict cannot possibly 
assume global proportions."20 There are supporters of the Court's holding, how-
ever, and there is no consensus on this issue.2L 
In light of current developments, the distinction between international and 
non- international armed conflict may be becoming irrelevant, at least as long as an 
"armed conflict" is present. As Kenneth Watkin has noted, there is a "trend under 
humanitarian law to apply the established rules fo r governing international armed 
conflict to its non-international counterpart."22 This trend, however, has not been 
based on the conclusion of new conventions, or even the revision of old conventions, 
on the law of armed contlict. Rather, it has been based on international judicial deci-
sions, especially the decision of the lCTY Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Tadii, 
which claimed in 1995 that "it cannot be denied that customary rules have devel-
oped to govern internal strife."23 The Tribunal identified some of these rules as 
covenng 
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such areas as protection of civilians from hostilities, in particular from indiscriminate 
attacks, protection of civilian objects, in particular cultural property, protection of all 
those who do not (or no longer) take active part in hostilities, as well as prohibition of 
means of warfare proscribed in international armed conflicts and ban of certain 
methods of conducting hostilities.24 
The ICRC has also actively promoted the idea of applying the rules governing 
international armed conflict to non-international armed conflict through the cus-
tomary international law process, especially in its two-volume Customary Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law study.25 Customary international law has long played an 
important role in the development of the law of armed conflict, as illustrated by 
the Martens Clause, which was named after Frederick de Martens, a leading Russian 
international lawyer who was a Russian delegate to the Hague Peace Conferences 
of 1889 and 1907. The Martens Clause first appeared in the preambles of Hague 
Convention (II ) of 1899 and Hague Convention (N) of 1907 Respecting the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land.26 A recent example of the Martens Clause may be 
found in Article 1(2) of Protocol I of 1977, which reads as follows: "In cases not 
covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and com-
batants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of interna-
tionallaw derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and 
from the dictates of public conscience." 
It should be noted, however, that the nature of the customary international law 
process has become increasingly controversial. Patrick Kelly, a leading critic, has 
suggested that in many-perhaps most-instances of alleged customary interna-
tionallaw norms, there may be little dear evidence that the vast majority of States 
have accepted the norm as a legal obligation.27 The result is that, according to Kelly, 
"much of international law is announced in books and articles with little input 
from nations .... Much ofClL [customary internationallaw[ is a fiction. "28 It 
should come as no surprise therefore that the methodology employed by the ICRC 
in its study of customary international humanitarian law has itself come under at-
tack-most particularly, in the November 3, 2006 joint letter from John Bellinger 
III, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, and William J. Haynes, General Coun-
sel, U.S. Department of Defense, to Dr. Jakob Kellenberger, the President of the 
ICRC, setting forth the U.S. government's "initial reactions" to the ICRe's study.29 
The letter states that "based on our review so far, we are concerned about the meth-
odology used to ascertain rules and about whether the authors have proffered suffi-
cient facts and evidence to support those rules." Although noting that «[g[iven the 
Study's large scope, we have not yet been able to complete a detailed review of its 
conclusions," the authors go on to state that they thought it would be "constructive 
to outline some of our basic methodological concerns and, by examining a few of 
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the rules set forth in the Study, to illustrate how these flaws call into question some 
of the Study's conclusions."30 
A detailed discussion of the authors' concerns is beyond the scope of this essay. 
For present purposes it suffices to note that the letter finds fault with both the 
study's assessment of State pmctice and its approach to the opinio juris require-
ment. The authors also find fault with the study's formulation of the rules and its 
commentary. Significantly, the letter finds that these faul ts contribute to 
two more general errors in the Study that are of particular concern to the United States: 
First, the assertion that a significant number of rules contained in the Additional Pro-
tocols to the Geneva Conventions have achieved the status of customary international 
law applicable to all States, including with respect to a significant number of$tates (in-
cluding the United States and a number of other States that have been involved in 
armed conflict since the Protocols entered into fo rce) that have declined to become a 
party to those Protocols; and 
Second, the assertion that certain rules contained in the Geneva Conventions and the 
Additional Protocols have become binding as a matter of customary intemationallaw 
in internal anned conflict notwithstanding the fact that there is little evidence in sup-
port of those propositions.3l 
In closing the letter the authors indicated their "appreciation fo r the JeRe's con-
tinued efforts in this important area, and hope that the material provided in this 
letter and in the attachment will initiate a constructive, in-depth dialogue with the 
JeRe and others on the subject."32 
In July 2007, Jean-Marie Henckaerts responded to the Bellinger/Haynes letter)3 
His response focused largely on methodological issues and, following the structure 
of the U.S. comments, addressed the following questions: 
I. What density of practice is required for the format ion of customary international 
law and what types of practice are relevant? 
2. How did the Study assess the existence of opillio juris! 
3. What is the weight of the commentaries on the rules? 
4. What are the broader implications of the Study with respect to Additional Proto-
cols I and II and the law on non-international anned conflicts in particular? 
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Because U.S. comments also addressed four particular rules of the study, 
Henckaerts's response dealt with the main aspects ofthose comments as part of the 
discussion of the methodological issues. The rules included "Rule 31 (protection of 
humanitarian relief personnel), Rule 45 (p rohibition on causing long-term wide-
spread and severe damage to the environment), Rule 78 (prohibition of the use of 
antipersonnel exploding bullets) and Rule 157 (right to establish universal juris-
diction over war crimes).":J.I 
As with respect to the Bellinger/Haynes letter, this is not the time or place to set 
forth a detailed discussion of Henckaerts's responses to the U.S. concerns. For 
present purposes, it suffices to note that the JCRC rejects the U.S. contention that 
there is little evidence to support the assertion that certain rules in the Geneva Con-
ventions and the Additional Protocols have become binding as a matter of custom-
ary international law in internal armed conflict. On the contrary, in the ICRC view: 
[TJhe conclusion of the Study that many rules contained in the Geneva Conventions 
and the Additional Protocols have become binding as a matter of customary interna-
tional law in non-international armed conflict is the result of state practice to this 
effect. ... 
[DJeveiopments of in ternational humanitarian law since the wars in the fo rmer 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda point towards an application of many areas of humanitarian 
law to non-international armed conflicts. For example, every humanitarian law 
treaty adopted since 1996 has been made applicable to both international and non-
international armed conflicts ... . 
The criminal tribunals and courts set up, first for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
and later for Sierra Leone, deal exclusively or mostly with violations committed in non-
international armed conflicts. Similarly, the investigations and prosecutions currently 
under way before the International Criminal Court are related to violations committed 
in situations of internal armed conflict . These developments are also sustained by 
other practice such as military manuals, national legislation and case-law, official 
statements and resolutions of international organizations and conferences. In this re-
spect particular care was taken in Volume I to identify specific practice related to 
non-international armed conflict and, on that basis, to provide a separate analysis of 
the customary nature of the rules in such conflicts. Finally, where practice was less ex-
tensive in non-international armed conflicts, the corresponding rule is acknowledged 
to be only "arguably" applicable in non-international armed conflicts. 
When it comes to "operational practice" related to non-international armed conflicts, 
there is probably a large mix of official practice supporting the rules and of their out-
right violation. To suggest, therefore, that there is not enough practice to sustain such a 
broad conclusion is to confound the value of existing "positive" practice with the many 
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violations of the law in non-international armed conflicts. This would mean that we let 
violators dictate the law or stand in the way of rules emerging. The result would be that 
a whole range of heinous practices committed in non-international armed conflict 
would no longer be considered unlawful and that commanders ordering such practices 
would no longer be responsible for them. This is not what states have wanted They 
have wanted the law to apply to non-international armed conflicts and they have 
wanted commanders to be responsible and accountable.3s 
The Bellinger/Haynes letter, in challenging the ICRC study's assertion that cer-
tain rules contained in the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols have 
become binding as a matter of customary international law in internal armed con-
fli ct, claims that "there is little evidence in support of those propositions."36 The 
Henckaerts response attempts to provide such evidence. First, it correctly notes 
that "every humanitarian law treaty adopted since 1996 has been made applicable 
to both international and non-international armed conflict.")7 But none of these 
treaties extends any of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions or of the Addi-
tional Protocols to non-international armed conflict, so the relevance of this State 
practice to the issue is questionable at best. 
Similarly, it is, of course, correct that the International Criminal Tribunals for 
the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as the globally focused International 
Criminal Court and the hybrid tribunal for Sierra Leone, deal exclusively or mostly 
with violations committed in non-international armed conflicts. The basic issue 
faced by these various tribunals is whether the concept of war crimes and grave 
breaches are applicable in internal as well as international armed conflict. Resolu-
tion of this issue in turn depends upon the statutes of the various tribunals and the 
tribunals' interpretation of their terms. 
As Gary Solis has noted, the ICfY Appeals Chamber, in its decision in the Tadii 
case, first answered the basic question in the negative. According to the Appeals 
Chamber, "[ we [ must conclude that, in the present state of development of the law, 
Artide 2 of the [IerY[ Statute ["Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949"] 
only applies to offences committed within the context of international armed con-
flicts. "38 By its decision the Appeals Chamber reversed the Trial Chamber's ruling 
to the contrary. At the same time, later in its decision, in dicta, the Appeals Chamber 
foreshadowed later change when it stated, 
[W]e have no doubt that they [violations of rules of warfare in intemationallaw] entail 
individual responsibility, regardless of whether they are committed in internal or inter-
national armed conflicts. Principles and rules of humanitarian law reflect "elementary 
considerations of humanity" widely recognized as the mandatory minimum for con-
duct in armed conflicts of any kind.:J9 
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As Solis notes, six years later the Appeals Chamber took the step it had fore-
shadowed in its dicta in TadiC.<IO It ruled in the Celebici case that "to maintain a le-
gal distinction between the two legal regimes and their criminal consequences in 
respect of similarly egregious acts because of the differences in the nature of the 
conflicts would ignore the very purpose of the Geneva Conventions. "41 
Many commentators welcomed the Celebici ruling. Guenael Mettraux, for ex-
ample, opined that "[t ]he acknowledgement by the ad hoc [Yugoslav and Rwanda] 
Tribunals that much of the law of international armed conflicts would apply in the 
context of internal armed conflicts may be one of their most significant jurispru-
dential achievements, as far as war crimes are concerned."42 For his part, Theodor 
Meron emphatically stated, "There is no moral justification, and no truly persua-
sive legal reason, for treating perpetrators of atrocities in internal conflicts more 
leniently than those engaged in international wars. "00 
This commentator, however, is concerned that both the Yugoslav and Rwanda 
tribunals and commentators such as Mettraux and Meron may be setting forth the 
de lege ferenda rather than the lex lata. To put it somewhat differently, they may be 
failing to distinguish between the is and the ought. There would seem to be compel-
ling reasons for applying much of the law of international armed conflict in the 
context of non-international armed conflicts, but it is not clear that States, acting 
through treaties or the customary international law process, have done so. Neither 
judges on the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals nor prominent scholars, despite the 
important roles they play in the international legal process in general, have been 
endowed with the capacity to make that extension of the law. 
On the other hand, Solis may be on sounder ground when he reports that " [t ]he 
domestic legislation of fifty-four states criminalizes serious violations of LOAC in 
internal armed conflicts."44 Such legislation is generally regarded as constituting a 
form of State practice that may contribute to the formulation of a customary inter-
national law norm. Moreover, the binding nature of such legislation in the domes-
tic legal system of the acting State may supply evidence of opinio juris, acceptance of 
the practice as law, the second, and perhaps most important, element of customary 
internationallaw.4s 
Solis also points to the United Kingdom's Manual of the Law of Armed Cot/flict 
in support of the proposition that customary international law provides for war 
crimes and grave breaches in non-international armed conflicts.46 He quotes the 
Manual as follows: 
Although the treaties governing internal armed conflict contain no grave breach provi-
sions, customary international law recognizes that serious violations of those treaties 
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can amount to punishable war crimes. It is now recognized that there is a growing area 
of conduct that is criminal in both international and internal armed conflict .... ~ 7 
Yoram Dinstein has applauded reliance on legislative codes and military manuals 
as illustrations of State practice: "Irrefutably, legislative codes and military Manu-
als (i.e., binding instructions to the armed forces) are invaluable sources of genuine 
State practice."48 It is noteworthy, however, that Solis cites and quotes only the 
U.K. Manual. It is not clear, therefore, whether the position of the U.K. Manual has 
been adopted in the manuals of other major military powers. 
In any event, it is likely that the challenges contained in the Bellinger/Haynes 
letter to the alleged two general errors in the ICRC study will not be successful. This 
is because the two positions of the ICRC study are so attractive as de lege ferenda 
that they will eventually be accepted as the lex lata. The reality is that Common 
Article 3 and Protocol II are clearly inadequate to govern non -international armed 
conflicts, and selective extension of the legal regime governing international armed 
conflicts to supplement the current law governing non -international armed 
conflicts makes enormous good sense. Ideally, of course, this extension should be 
effected by the conclusion of new---or the revision of current-global treaties. But 
if this method of extension is a mission impossible, as the evidence convincingly 
demonstrates, then customary international law methodology will have to be em-
ployed, even if there is continuing disagreement as to exactly what that methodol-
ogy entails. 
II. Rethinking the Possible Benefits of Additional Protocol II 
Perhaps it is time for the United States to reevaluate the possible benefits of bee om-
ing a party to Additional ProtocollI. As indicated above, the primary criticism of 
Additional Protocol II has been that its threshold of applicability is too high. It 
should be noted, however, that when President Ronald Reagan submitted Addi-
tional Protocol II to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification,49 he did so 
with a declaration that read : "The United States declares that it will apply this Pro-
tocol only to those conflicts covered by Article 3 common to the Geneva Conven-
tion of 12 August 1949 and to all such conflicts, and encourages all other States to 
do likewise." Secretary of State George P. Shultz's Letter of Submittal to President 
Reagan of December 13, 1986 describes the reasons for the declaration: 
The final text of Protocol II did not meet all the desires of the United States and other 
western delegations. In particular, the Protocol only applies to internal conflicts in which 
dissident annedgroups are under responsible command and exercise control over such a 
part of the national territory as to carry out sustained and concerted militaryoperations. 
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This is a narrower scope than we would have desired, and has the effect of excluding 
many internal conflicts in which dissident armed groups occupy no significant terri-
tory but conduct sporadic guerrilla operations over a wide area. We are therefore rec-
ommending that US ratification be subject to an understanding declaring that the 
United States will apply the Protocol to all conflicts covered by Article 3 common to the 
1949 Conventions (and only such conflicts), which will include all non-international 
armed conflicts as traditionally defined (but not internal disturbances, r iots and 
sporadic acts of violence). This understanding will also have the effect of treating as 
non-international these so-called "wars of national liberation" described in Article 
1 (4) of Protocol I which fail to meet the traditional test of an international conflict.50 
The approach of the Reagan administration, therefore, would resolve the pri-
mary problem of Additional Protocol II by declining to follow the provisions of Ar-
ticle 1 ( I ) of Additional Protocol II that would severely limit its applicability, opting 
instead to apply its other provisions to all non-international armed conflict cov-
ered by Common Article 3. It also would counter the most unacceptable-to the 
United States-aspect of Additional Protocol I by treating as non-international the 
"wars of national liberation" that are described and treated in Article 1(4) of Addi-
tional Protocol I as international armed conflicts. Such an approach might serve to 
turn Additional Protocol II from its current status as a basically non-operational 
treaty to one that could usefully be applied to many of the internal conflicts charac-
teristic of to day's armed conflicts, and a treaty that could enhance and strengthen 
the legal regime governing non-international armed conflicts. 
The report of the Department of State on Additional Protocol II, transmitted by 
President Reagan with the Protocol to the Senate,SI contains a detailed analysis of 
the various provisions of the Protocol. In his Letter of Submittal to President Reagan, 
Secretary of State George Shultz spells out the ways in which the Protocol 
was designed to expand and refme the basic humanitarian provisions contained in 
Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions with respect to non· international 
conflicts. While the Protocol does not (and should not) attempt to apply to such 
conflicts all the protections prescribed by the Conventions for international armed 
conflicts. such as prisoner-of-war treatment for captured combatants, it does attempt 
to guarantee that certain fundamental protections be observed, including: (1) humane 
treatment for detained persons, such as protection from violence, torture, and collec-
tive punishment; (2) protection from intentional attack, hostage-taking and acts ofter-
rorism of perwns who take no part in hostilities; (3) special protection for children to 
provide for their safety and education and to preclude their participation in hostilities; 
(4) fundamental due process for persons against whom sentences are to be passed or 
penalties executed; (5) protection and appropriate care for the sick and wounded, and 
medical units which assist them; and (6) protection of the civilian population from 
military attack, acts of terror, deliberative starvation, and attacks against installations 
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containing dangerous forces. In each case, Protocol II expands and makes more spe-
cific the basic guarantees of common Article 3 of the 1949 Conventions.52 
Hence, application of Additional Protocol II to non-international armed con-
flicts would greatly strengthen the humanitarian protections of Common Article 3, 
and, as President Reagan suggested in his Letter of Transmittal, "[ iJfthese funda-
mental rwes were obselVed, many of the worst human tragedies of current internal 
armed conflicts could be avoided."51 
It is worth noting that on March 7, 2011, the Obama administration issued a 
White House press release in which it indicated its strong support for the ratifica-
tion of Additional Protocol II and its intention to apply the principles of Article 75 
of Protocol I to "any individual it detains in an international armed conflict."S4In 
pertinent part, the press release reads as follows: 
Support for a Strong International Legal Framework 
Because of the vital importance of the rule oflaw to the effectiveness and legitimacy of 
our national security policy, the Administration is announcing our support for two 
important components of the internationailegaI framework that covers armed con-
flicts: Additional Protocol II and Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. 
Additional Protocol II, which contains detailed humane treatment standards and fair 
trial guarantees that apply in the context of non-international anned conflicts, was 
originally submitted to the Senate for approval by President Reagan in 1987. The Ad-
ministration urges the Senate to act as soon as practicable on this Protocol, to which 
165 States are a party. An extensive interagency review concluded that United States 
military practice is already consistent with the Protocol's provisions. Joining the treaty 
would not only assist us in continuing to exercise leadership in the international com-
m uni ty in developing the lawof armed conflict, but would also allow us to reaffirm our 
commitment to humane treatment in, and compliance with legal standards for, the 
conduct of anned conflict. 
Article 75 of Additional Protocol I, which sets forth fundamental guarantees for per-
sons in the hands of opposing forces in an international armed conflict, is similarly im-
portant to the international legal framework. Although the Administration continues 
to have significant concerns with Additional Protocol I, Article 75 is a provision of the 
treaty that is consistent with our current policies and practice and is one that the 
United States has historically supported. 
Our adherence to these principles is also an important safeguard against the mistreat-
ment of captured U.S. military personnel. The U.S. Government will therefore choose 
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out of a sense oflega! obligation to treat the principles set forth in Article 75 as applica-
ble to any individual it detains in an international armed confl ict, and expects all other 
nations to adhere to these principles as well.55 
The comments of the Reagan administration and more recently of the Obama 
administration would seem to belie the dismissive remarks of George Aldrich re-
garding the value of Additional Protocol II , reported earlier in this essay.Sti In sharp 
contrast to the Aldrich position, both the Reagan and Obama administrations state 
forcefully that ratification of Additional Protocol II would greatly expand on and 
strengthen the humanitarian provisions of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Con-
ventions. President Reagan pointed out that Additional Protocol II "makes clear 
that any deliberate killing of a noncombatant in the course of a non-international 
armed conflict is a violation of the laws of war and a crime against humanity, and is 
therefore also punishable as murder. "57 
In another part of his message President Reagan foreshadows the approach 
more specifically adopted by the Obama administration with respect to Additional 
Protocol 1. While emphatically rejecting ratification of Additional Protocol I, he 
stated at the same time a desire to 
devise an alternative reference for the positive provisions of Protocol I that could be of 
real humanitarian benefit if generally observed by parties to international armed con-
flicts. We are therefore in the processof consulting with our allies to deveJop appropri-
ate methods for incorporating these positive provisions into the rules that govern our 
military operations, and as customary international law. I will advise the Senate of the 
results of this initiative as soon as it is possible to do SO.58 
It appears that President Reagan never advised the Senate of the results of his 
administration's initiative. For its part, the Obama administration appears to have 
acted without consulting allies-although this is not clear-in deciding to treat 
Article 75 of Additional Protocol I as binding on the United States and choosing to 
" treat the principles set forth in Article 75 as applicable to any individual it detains 
in an international armed conflict," and expecting "all o ther nations to adhere to 
these principles as well."59 If this policy is implemented by the Obama administra-
tion, this would greatly strengthen the argument that Article 75 is part of custom-
ary international law. 
As to whether the Senate will finally give its advice and consent to U.S. ratifica-
tion of Additional Protocol II , it is hard to be optimistic, because the Senate has so 
many other issues before it that are likely to receive higher priority. But it appears 
the Reagan and Obama administrations have set forth a convincing case for the 
Senate's giving its advice and consent to ratification. 
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U.S. ratification of Additional Protocol II and application of its substantive 
provisions to any armed conflict covered by Common Article 3 would also make 
law in non-international armed conflict much less of a will-o'-the-wisp. This 
would be an important step because, as Eyal Benvenisti has noted in a recent pro-
vocative essay,60 there is currently an emerging struggle between "states engaged 
in transnational armed conflict [read non-international asymmetric warfare] and 
third parties---courts, international institutions, NGOs, and civil society-in de-
veloping and enforcing the laW."61 
Ill. Who Shall Detennine the Lnw in Non-International Armed Conflicts? 
As noted earlier in this essay, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia has concluded in its decisions that "customary rules have developed to 
govern internal strife. "62 For his part, Benvenisti states emphatically that the appli-
cability of international criminal law 
to internal armed conflicts must be attributed to the jurisprudence of the International 
Criminal Tribunal ofthe former Yugoslavia ("ICIY"), which has in only a few years of 
adjudicating war crimes in the former Yugoslavia virtually rewritten the law on internal 
armed conflicts. By fo rmally asserting the law['Js customary status, the ICrY overcame 
years of governmental resistance to regulating methods for fighting insurgents.63 
Benvenisti believes that the increased involvement of various third-party actors, 
including domestic courts, foreign governments and courts, international organi-
zations and international tribunals, humanitarian NGOs, and domestic and global 
civil society, in indirect monitoring, lawmaking and enforcement functions consti-
tutes a major challenge to States. As Benvenisti suggests: 
[Tlhe intensified involvement of third parties creates a new confl ict between the con-
ventional armies that fight insurgents or terrorists and seek more discretion and fewer 
constraints and the third parties who insist on maintaining and even increasing con-
straints in warfare. We might call it a conflict between the "IHL camp," that emphasizes 
the hwnanitarian aim of the jlls in bello, which they refer to as International Humani-
tarian Law, and the "LOAC camp," that wishes to point out that the Law of Armed 
Conflict is primarily designed to regulate the relations between fighting armies and 
therefore must take military concerns seriously into account. The LOAC camp insists 
that this "lawfare" is not only hypocri tical but also perilous: that the IHL camp is being 
manipulated by the terrorists, who endanger the population on whose behalf they osten-
sibly fight by their abuse of civilian immunities. In a sense, and certainly unwillingly, the 
IHL camp becomes a strategic ally of the terrorists because the terrorists benefit indi-
rectly from whatever constraints the IHL camp would impose.64 
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It is worthwhile quoting Benvenisti 's swnmary of the argwnents of the third-
party actors at some length, because they couldn't be more in sharp contrast to the 
arguments advanced by governments, and their supporters, engaged in the asym-
metric warfare characteristic of non-international armed conflict: 
In general, third party actors. and certainly third party norm entrepreneurs, suggest 
that the legal restraints on transnational conflict must treat the stronger party as re-
sponsible for positively protecting the population in the theater of operation from 
harm because the stronger party often exclusively, has effective----even if only virtual---
control over the population. In fact, with recourse to new types of weaponry and re-
connaissance tools, with 24/7 presence of unmanned aerial vehicles ("UAV") over for-
eign territory, contemporary armies often have the capacity to control some of the 
activities of the population on the ground effectively as an occupying power. Such con-
trol can perhaps be regarded as virtual occupation. As the law stands, during conven-
tional international armed conflict, obligations to occupied populations are more 
demanding than those toward fo reign civilians in the combat zone. 
This last point requires explanation: in symmetric warfare, the attacker's power does 
not amount to an ability to fully control the lives of the enemy's population. The de-
fending government is still in control and in fact forcefully resists the attacker's effort to 
gain exclusivity. Lacking such exclusive control, there is no basis to impose an obliga-
tion on the attacking army to Imsure enemy civilians' lives (protecting them, fo r exam-
ple, from internal ethnic conflicts). Their army, which is still in control, has the duty to 
ensure their rights. Instead, before and during the attack, the attacking army owes a 
duty to respect enemy civilians' lives, consisting of the duty to avoid unnecessary harm. 
In contrast. the same army will assume the duty to e7lSure the rights of enemy civilians 
when they become subject to its effective control as prisoners of war or "protected per-
sons" in occupied territories. An obligation to ensure the civilians' rights is fundamen-
tally different from an obligation to respect them, applicable to parties to symmetric 
conflicts. The vertical power relations that exist in transnational asymmetric conflicts, 
particularly against non-state actors, seem to call for recognizing positive duties to-
wards those civilians, like in an occupation. Such a duty will reflect the nature and 
scope of the power that the "attacking" army (during an on-going, indefinite "attack") 
has over the attacked population. 
The obligation to protect in transnational asymmetric armed conflict. if recognized, 
would be quite demanding. It would call fo r three specific obligations. First, it would 
require the consideration of alternatives to military action and the determination of 
whether the decision to use fo rce against legitimate mil itary targets rather than explor-
ing non-forcible, or less-forcible alternatives. was justified under the circumstances. In 
fact it would imply injectingjus ad bellum considerations, or human rights law, into 
jus ill bello analysis. Secondly, if there were no available alternatives, a second require-
ment would demand that the army invest significant resources to minimize harm to 
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civilians. Finally, the anny would be required to conduct a transparent and account-
able investigation after the use of force. 
A case in point concerns the dispute about targeted killing. This policy treats individu-
als as military targets per se, given the paucityofconventional non-human military tar-
gets of an irregular fighting force. The LOAC camp argues that annies that target 
individual combatants regard them as legitimate targets in war, as there is no distinc-
tion between human and non-human military targets. But the alternative view issensi-
tive to the fact that the laws regarded the killing of combatants as a legitimate mealls to 
achieve military goals, rather than a goal in and of itself . AI; the 1868 St. Petersburg Dec-
laration envisioned, warwas not about killing combatants; wars were understood to be 
fought to achieve non-human military goals and fighting was to be conducted against 
an abstract, collective enemy. Therefore, itwas possible to stipulate that "the only legit-
imate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weakell the 
military forces of the enemy; That [sic[ for this purpose it is sufficient to disable the 
greatest possible number of men.» Although war always involved the killing of combat-
ants, killing the adversary was never the goal. Applying this logic to the effort to pre-
empt individuals from engaging in an attack would require a consideration of whether 
it is possible to di5'lble rather than kill them. This explains why the IHL camp insists on 
pausing to consider alternatives to targeted killing; something that is viewed by the 
LOAC camp as injecting irrelevant requirements of human rights law into jus ill bellD 
analysis. 
The tension between governments engaged in transnational warfare and third parties 
can therefore not be starker: whereas governments seek to deny or dilute the applicabil-
ity of conventional warfare obligations to transnational asymmetric conflicts, third 
parties insist on their applicability and lean toward imposing even more stringent 
constraints, which governments regard as impermissibly endangering their troops 
and irresponsibly immunizing non-state fighters. Only time can tell if and how this 
tension can be resolved.6S 
In the rest of his article Benvenisti argues that the growing involvement of third 
parties in the monitoring and assessment of military decisions "raises a third chal-
lenge to the legal regulation of warfare: how to regulate the exercise of discretion by 
the military commander."66 He suggests that in conventional, symmetric war fare 
the parties to the conflict are presumed to promote their self-interests and not the 
interests of the other government involved in the conflict. But with the pressure 
from third parties to positively protect enemy civilians it has arguably become nec-
essary for governments involved in non-international armed conflicts to consider 
interests other than their own. He notes that the greatly increased aCCeSS to infor-
mation about such conflicts afforded by technical advances in technology and im-
proved intelligence allows third parties to assess the exercise of discretion by the 
military commander. He adds, 
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If we accept that attacking armies in transnational asymmetric conflicts have a "duty 
to ensure" the lives of civilians in the area they attack then perhaps they are expected to 
treat all civilians with similar respect (obviously, such blindness would relate only to 
the hwnan rights of the relevant civilians and not to the national interests of the foreign 
state). It can be expe<:ted, however, that the WAC camp will resist such a conclusion, 
stating that there is no moral or legal basis for the obligation to consider other-regarding 
considerations in the absence of reciprocity and mutuality of obligations, when there is 
no assurance that others are equally committed to act selflessly.61 
In the conclusion to his article, Benvenisti states that 
[il it is beyond the scope of this essay to assess if and how such a cleavage between two 
visions of the law can be bridged and how the law would look in the future. Much 
depends on the continued ability of courts, both domestic and international, to assert 
positions independent of governments and the continued commitment of global civil 
society to constrain conventional armies .... Even the domestic courts of those govern-
ments that engage in such conflicts resist the demand to yield authority to the execu-
tive. If these attitudes persist, it can be expected that the recourse to third parties as 
partners in the regulation of transnational armed conflicts will expand.68 
By way of initial comment on some of the points made by Benvenisti, it shouJd 
be noted that, although the domestic courts of some governments that engage in 
non-international asymmetric armed conflict have asserted positions independent 
of their governments on the reguJation of such conflicts,69 other domestic courts, 
including those of the United States, have been quite deferential to the executive 
branch's decisions with respect to the conduct of hostilities in such conflicts.7° A 
good recent example of such deference by U.s. courts is the December 7, 2010 deci-
sion of the District Court for the District of Columbia dismissing a suit brought to 
enjoin the targeted killing of U.S. citizen Anwar Al-Aulaqi, who was operating out 
of Yemen.ll The court ruled that the plaintiff (Al-AuJaqi's father) did not have 
standing to bring the suit and that the political question doctrine barred the court 
from considering the merits of the plaintiffs suit. 
In describing the argwnents of third-party actors, Benvenisti states that "the legal 
restraints on transnational conflict must treat the stronger party as responsible fo r 
positively protecting the population in the theater of operation from harm because 
the stronger party often exclusively, has effective--even if only virtual--<ontrol 
over the population."72 In many cases involving asymmetric non-international 
armed conflicts, however, the stronger party has no such control over the popula-
tion. In Afghanistan, for example, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda forces embed them-
selves among the general population. Moreover, in Afghanistan, it is important to 
note, the sovereign power is not the U.S. government or coalition forces, but the 
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Afghan government of President Karzai. Increasingly, the Karzai government has 
demanded that there be no civilian casualties from drone or airplane attacks, thus 
denying the coalition forces an important military advantage. 
Moreover, to impose an obligation on U.S. and coali tion forces, as demanded by 
some third parties, to ensure that there are no civilian casualties in asymmetric 
non -international armed conflicts would be a dramatic change in the law of armed 
conflict and would ensure the failure of U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan 
and in other theaters where the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are operating. The reality is 
that so-called "collateral damage" to civilians is unavoidable in armed conflict, and 
especially in the asymmetric non-international armed conflict characteristic of to-
day's wars. The current test under the law of armed conflict is whether the collat-
eral damage is expected to be "excessive" in relation to the concrete and direct 
military advantage anticipated.73 
In a recent essay, Samuel Estreicher has helpfully emphasized that "[dlangers to 
civilians during armed conflict are a joint product of both attackers and defenders, 
and minimization of such harm- presumably the overriding mission of IHL-
requires establishing the right incentives for bolll attackers and defenders."74 
£Streicher also quotes the observat ion ofW. Hays Parks in his "classic" article, «Air 
War and the Law of War," that 
Protocol I constitutes an improvement in the law of war in recognizing that an attacker 
should, in most cases, give consideration to minimization of collateral civilian casual-
ties. The issue is the degree to which an attacker should assume this responsibility. If the 
new rules of Protocol I are to have any credibility, the predominant responsibilitymust 
remain with the defender, who has control over the civilian population.7s 
£Streicher elaborates on Parks's point by noting that 
[ilt is clear that attackers cannot, because of defender violations, claim excuse for their 
non-compliance with, say, their duty to "do everything feas ible to verify that the objec-
tives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian objects" under AP I, Article 
57(2)(a)(i). But the feasibility inquiry under Article 57(2)(a)(i), or the proportionality 
inquiry under Article 57(2)(a)(iii), necessarily requires that account be taken of 
whether defenders have disguised military operations as civilian operations or have 
deliberately embedded their military assets in close proximity to civilian areas, all in 
violation of defender obligations under IHL.'6 
In a subsequent, follow-up essay,77 Estreicher focuses on the "so-called princi-
ple of ' proportionality.'" He explains that he uses 
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the qualifying adjective "so-called" because "proportionality" in this context is a mis-
nomer. The actual obligation, as set forth in Articles 51(S)(b) and 57(2)(b) of AP I, 
speaks in terms of prohibiting (and deferring) attacks expected to cause incidental 
civilian losses "which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military 
advantage anticipated." . .. [TJhe "excessive loss" formulation is not only truer to the 
text of AP I but provides a sounder, more principled basis for judging violations than 
the more elastic, manipulable "proportionality" formulation. 78 
The "excessive loss" formulation is afortiori a more principled basis for judging 
violations than the requirement reportedly proposed by some third parties that 
parties to asymmetric warfare "positively protect" enemy civilians. 79 To hold a mil-
itary commander to such a standard would be grossly dysfunctional, as well as 
grossly unfair if violations of this standard would subject the military commander 
to possible criminal or civil penalties. Hence, it is certain that despite pressure that 
may be brought to bear by third parties to asymmetric armed conflicts, this stan-
dard will be rejected by the governments of States that are engaged in such con-
flicts, including most particularly that of the United States. 
IV. Conclusion 
The title of this essay states there is a search for law in non-international armed 
conflicts. Perhaps, however, a more precise way to describe the current situation is as 
a struggle for law in non-international armed conflicts. As noted by Eyal Benvenisti, 
this is a struggle between States that are actively involved in non-international 
armed conflict and a wide array of third-party actors, such as domestic courts, 
foreign governments and courts, international organizations and international tri-
bunals, humanitarian NGOs, and domestic and global civil society. Some of these 
third-party actors are promoting an agenda that, if adopted as law, could severely 
restrict the military capacity of the armed forces of States to deal effectively with 
Al-Qaeda and other non-State actors employing various strategies to negate the 
military superiority of the States they are fighting against. 
At least to some extent, these third-party actors have been able to be influential 
because of the inability of States to reform and develop the law applicable to non-
international armed conflicts through the conclusion of global treaties that would 
update the law in such a way as to resolve the tension between humanitarian con-
siderations and the need for military efficiency. The recent efforts of the Obama ad-
ministration to carry forward the position of the Reagan administration to have the 
United States finally ratify Additional ProtocollI, while issuing a declaration that it 
will not apply the high threshold requirements of the Protocol and will urge other 
States parties to follow suit, may be a first step toward overcoming the barriers 
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to expanding and improving the law of Don-internat ional armed conflkt. Should 
the United States take th is step, and other States follow suit, at a minim um it 
should allow like- mined States to cooperate to improve the efficiency of efforts 
to deal with the challenge they face in conducting asymmetrk warfare, and 
could perhaps lead to State practice that evolves eventually into norms of cus-
tomary international law applicable to non-international armed conflict. Failure 
of States like the United States and its allies to win this struggle for law in non-
international armed conflicts with these third-party actors would have extremely 
negative effects on their national security. 
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